Abstract: This paper considers the effect of financial liberalisation on access to investment finance using firm level data covering 48 developing and transition countries. An index is presented which measures financial market liberalisation along the following policy dimensions: directed lending, credit controls and reserve requirements, state control of banking, openness of international financial flows, banking market entry, prudential regulation and supervision and securities market development. Categorising firms as financially constrained across four measures, the results indicate that financial liberalisation is robustly associated with a reduction in the probability of being credit constrained, with the effect strongest for young, domestic private small and medium sized enterprises. For Sub-Saharan Africa, the results indicate that financial liberalisation actually increases financing constraints for firms. This may help explain the stylised fact that despite a commitment to financial reform, the predicted growth benefits have not been realised in this region.
Introduction
In recent decades, there has been a particular focus in developing countries on achieving financial development through liberalising capital markets. This process is supported and promoted by research highlighting the causal role of finance in delivering economic growth (King and Levine 1993; Levine 1997 Levine , 2005 Levine et al. 2000) . The core theme in this literature posits that financial liberalisation leads to financial development which in turn gives rise to economic growth. One channel through which financial reform is beneficial is through improved access to finance, leading to higher and more efficient investment. By facilitating better credit access, financial liberalisation allows constrained firms to obtain vital funds with which capital investment plans can be undertaken (Haramillo et al. 1996; Gelos and Werner 2002; Love 2003; Beck et al. 2004; Galindo et al. 2007) .
However work by Andersen and Tarp (2003) , Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2003) , and Andersen et al. (2012) asks fundamental questions about the finance-growth thesis and suggests the literature promoting financial liberalisation as a cornerstone of economic development policy is questionable. They argue that financial liberalisation has not delivered either development of domestic financial systems or improved economic outcomes. Pointing to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and other developing countries, they highlight the extensive financial reforms undertaken and point to the lack of improvements in economic outcomes following reform. Furthermore theoretical research by Hellman et al. (1997) and Emran and Stiglitz (2009) argues that financial restraint can actually lead to positive economic outcomes. Hellman et al. (1997) notes that moral hazard in financial markets can actually be reduced as deposit rate controls and restrictions on competition create franchise value in financial markets. They also show that lending rate controls can reduce agency costs in lending thus increasing the efficiency of intermediated finance. Empirical evidence by Costantini et al. (2013) indicates that capping domestic real interest rates, in low inflation environments, leads to higher levels of private investment than those that would have been obtained under liberalized conditions. Additionally, a number of studies have questioned the benefits of bank privatisation in leading to better outcomes (Andrianova et al. 2008 (Andrianova et al. , 2012 and linked financial liberalisation to distortions in human capital and technology adoption (Ang 2011) .
Given these considerations, this paper builds on the existing literature by evaluating the effect of financial liberalisation on access to finance in developing countries. The specific contribution is as follows: first, using data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES), an extensive dataset is collated covering 26,440 firms across 48 developing and transition economies including 22 economies in SSA. This improves the country coverage as compared to existing research (Haramillo et al. 1996; Barajas et al. 2000; Gelos and Werner 2002; Koo and Shin 2004; Koo and Maeng 2005; Galindo et al. 2007; Abiad et al. 2008) . Second, with a view to both capturing the multifaceted nature of financial liberalisation as well as maximising the country coverage, a financial liberalisation index is developed using data on financial market structure and financial regulation from Barth et al. (2008) . The index covers, in as much depth as possible, the financial reform dimensions outlined in Abiad et al. (2010) . Using a broad-based index improves upon the work that evaluates liberalisation using a single or limited number of policy dimensions. Importantly, the new index improves the coverage across SubSaharan Africa (SSA) with 22 countries included. The index is then mapped to the firm-level data from the World Bank enterprise surveys.
Thirdly, following Rand (2007) , Byiers et al. (2010) and Hansen and Rand (2011) , access to finance is measured by defining four groups of credit constrained firms: "General Constrained," "New Entrants," "Active Investors" and "Deterred Investors." The categories are developed using direct survey questions on loan applications denied, the use of internal funds and informal finance to cover investment expenditure, the presence of existing credit lines and the reasons for not making loan applications. Our indicators move away from existing studies which identify credit constraints using investment-cash flow sensitivities or perception measures of finance as an obstacle to growth (Haramillo et al. 1996; Barajas et al. 2000; Gelos and Werner 2002; Beck et al. 2004; Koo and Shin 2004; Koo and Maeng 2005; Clarke et al. 2006) . The estimation strategy uses a standard probit framework. The analysis also focuses on the differential effect of liberalisation on constraints by firm size, age, ownership and legal status as well as focusing on the effect in SSA.
For the whole sample, the results indicate that financial liberalisation is robustly correlated with a lower probability of being credit constrained across all four constraint definitions. The estimated coefficients on financial liberalisation are negative and statistically significant suggesting that improvements in the overall level of capital market liberalisation associate with better financing access for firms.
While this may be the case on an aggregate basis, focusing on countries in SSA, whose institutions are more likely to be underdeveloped or governance weaker, there is evidence that the benefits of financial liberalisation do not materialise at all. The findings indicate firms in SSA are more constrained than those in other regions and constraints appear to be positively correlated with financial liberalisation for all categories except "Active Investors." Recent research by Andersen et al. (2012) highlights the fact that African economies have been reformist in liberalising credit markets but have lagged in terms of their growth performance, especially in comparison with the Asian countries. That liberalisation does not appear to be associated with improved access to finance may go some way to explaining the disconnect between the pro-reform policies and the poor growth performance. The results are also suggestive that global capital openness policy must be mindful of the country-specific level of development and institutional quality and must not be based on a one-size fits all approach.
The findings suggest that, at lower levels of development, financial liberalisation can actually be associated with a deterioration in firms access to credit and therefore capital controls may be required until institutional quality can safeguard against adverse outcomes.
To test the impact of specific capital market developments, the FL index is split between its subcomponents and each one tested individually. A number of findings emerge. The two factors with the strongest negative association with credit constraints are the development of the securities markets and the ability of banks to engage in international financial activities. Developing non-bank securities markets may lead to a broadening of the banks skill set and provide new monitoring and evaluation capacities. This may in turn improve their ability to understand investment opportunities and reduce information asymmetries between opaque borrowers and lenders. Facilitating engagement in international financial activities can allow banks to lend beyond the value of potentially limited domestic savings and channel more credit to domestic borrowers. While not significant individually, in the full specification, there is evidence that reducing state control of the banking sector is also a positive policy development as it is associated with reduced domestic credit constraints. We find no effect of removing credit controls and financial supervision.
Of particular interest is the fact that we find entry barriers are associated with higher credit constraints, controlling for the other factors. This result is counter to conventional wisdom on the impact of entry of credit access but is in line with the findings in Emran and Stiglitz (2009) . They find that financial liberalisation may constrain the development of private sector activity as it reduces the incentives financial institutions have to provide experimental capital to entrepreneurs. They note this can occur due to poaching externalities in competitive systems or through the unwillingness to finance longer term, more learningoriented projects which do not have front loaded returns in competitive systems. The findings of this paper are in line with these views that entry barriers, by creating franchise value and ensuring some return, can facilitate banks to provide more higher-risk financing of longer duration and can improve the flow of credit to entrepreneurs.
We test the heterogeneity across groups of the impact of financial liberalisation by interacting the index with the following firm characteristics: size, age, ownership and whether or not it is publicly listed. The reduction in constraints from financial liberalisation is greatest for young, private domestic small-and medium-sized (SME) enterprises. The reduction is less for foreign and publicly listed firms. That SME financing constraints are more sensitive to financing liberalisation is important from a development perspective. International research points to the most constrained firms being SMEs (Beck et al. 2006 (Beck et al. , 2008 . Most foreign firms and domestic publicly-listed firms have ample access to international and national financing sources. If SMEs are the beneficiaries of financial liberalisation, this is a positive story for the ability of finance to facilitate growth through the investment channel.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the measures of credit constraints, financial liberalisation and the data used. Section 3 outlines the empirical model and econometric issues. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
Variable Measurement and Data
Assessing the effect of liberalisation on access to finance requires a combination of country-level estimates of financial reform and firm-level estimates of credit constraints. In this paper a number of sources are combined. The firm-level data to measure access to finance are taken from the WBES while the data measuring financial liberalisation are extracted from the World Bank survey of financial regulation and supervision (Barth et al. 2008) . This section describes the measures of credit constraints, the index of financial liberalisation and provides some summary statistics covering the main variables.
Measuring Access to Finance
This paper follows Byiers et al. (2010) and Hansen and Rand (2011) and uses firm-level data from the WBES to estimate four binary indicators of whether a firm faces credit constraints. Byiers et al. (2010) and Bigsten et al. (2003) focus on identifying only firms who are constrained due to failures/imperfections in capital markets as opposed to firms whose investments do not have a positive net present value at the economy wide market cost of capital. This definition is carried forward into the development of constraint indicators in this paper.
To identify credit constrained firms, a number of different questions from the WBES concerning access to financial markets are used. The first question to identify constrained firms is whether or not the they applied for and were denied loan facilities. This is a direct measure of excess demand for credit i.e., the firms that attempted to access credit facilities but were unsuccessful. As the question does not capture the reason for the refusal, some of the applying firms may have had poor quality investment proposals. In identifying these firms as credit constrained, we implicitly assume that the typical entrepreneurs' application had an internal rate of return at least equal to the market cost of capital. This question is used in Byiers et al. (2010) and Hansen and Rand (2011) .
The second question asks firms who did not apply for loans, the reason they did not do so. Firms are classified as constrained if they state one of the following reasons for not applying: i) the size of loan and maturity are insufficient, ii) application procedures for loans or line of credit are too complex, or iii) collateral requirements for loans or line of credit are unattainable. In line with Hansen and Rand (2011) , firms are not classified as constrained if they answered that the interest rate offer was prohibitive or they did not think they would be successful. The third question asks whether or not the firm has access to a formal line of credit (either a loan or working capital facility). Finally, information on the financing of investment is included. Firms are asked whether or not they purchased fixed assets and if so, how did they structure their investment finance. This paper focuses on the percentage of capital expenditure financed from internal funds or informal sources (moneylenders, family, friends etc). Both may be either a substitute or complement to external finance (from either banks, equity markets or other financial providers), however, an overreliance on the firms' own resources to fund investment is a well-established indicator of credit constraints [See Chirinko (1993) and Hubbard and Kashyap (1992) for discussion]. Internal or informal finance carry a differential cost of capital to external formal credit. As this may have implications for the efficient allocation of capital, it is of interest to this research question.
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To capture the heterogeneous nature of firms' interactions with capital markets and the non-uniform impact of financial liberalisation on the population of firms in the economy, we develop four categories of credit constrained firms using combinations of the aforementioned questions. The categories are: "General Constrained," "New Entrants," "Active Investors" and "Deterred Investors." Their links to the questions in the WBES survey are presented in Table 1 . Credit constraint one (C1), "General Constrained" takes the value of one if the 1 The frequently used measure in this literature is a categorical variable where firms are asked to rank access to finance as a relative obstacle to the firms' growth and development. The ranking scale runs from 0 (no constraint) to 4 (severe constraint). This measure has been used as the main dependent variable in research into access to finance (Beck et al. 2004; Clarke et al. 2006) . There are drawbacks to using this variable as it is influenced by the managers perception of credit access. For example, a firm may view the credit conditions in the economy as restrictive to its growth prospects, however, when offered finance at the market opportunity cost, their investments may no longer be viable. Due to these considerations, we do not use this indicator in our main analysis. firm applied for loan finance but was rejected or did not apply for loans due to capital market imperfections. It is similar to constraint one in Hansen and Rand (2011) . This constraint is used as a base case.
The three further categories tighten this definition. As financial markets are liberalised, one of the expected benefits is a widening of the use of formal financial services. In a development context, this equates to firms using formal finance for the first time. For constraint two (C2), "New Entrants," firms are classified as constrained using C1 but then reclassified as unconstrained if they currently have access to formal banking services (a loan or line of credit from a financial institution). This categorisation identifies firms who do not have formal finance, but attempted to apply for lending facilities or are put off by the current market structure. If financial liberalisation facilitates financial widening, it is expected that these firms should also be beneficiaries.
The third constraint (C3) uses C1 as a base, but for this category, we identify those firms who are constrained but went ahead and undertook investment financed using either internal funds or finance from informal sources (moneylenders, friends or relatives). We classify this category as "Active Investors." These firms are actively investing using internal funds or informal credit which indicates that they have positive net present value investment opportunities and are willing to commit to these in the current economic environment. As internal funds are limited and informal sources can be unreliable and often costly, both can be seen as imperfect substitutes for formal external finance. These firms may have undertaken additional investment, paid a lower cost of capital on committed capital expenditure, or freed internal funds for use in operational activities if formal external finance had been made available. The final constraint (C4) classifies firms as "Deterred Investors." These firms are identified as constrained using C1 but re-classified as unconstrained if they did not invest. This group represents firms who have foregone investment opportunities due to the capital market imperfections they faced when seeking credit lines. If, following financial liberalisation, financial development occurs, we would expect this group to benefit. In the post-reform environment credit should be available to facilitate investing in positive net present value investment opportunities.
Identifying four categories of credit constrained firms should cater for the heterogeneous nature of firms' interaction with financial markets. It should also provide a platform to adequately assess the multifaceted and multidimensional aspects of financial reform and how it affects businesses on the ground.
Financial Liberalisation in Developing Countries
The main challenge facing researchers working in the area of financial liberalisation and capital market reform has been the absence of a comparable crosscountry database that captures the multifaceted nature and complex policy dimensions of financial liberlisation. Recent work by Abiad et al. (2010) addresses this issue and presents a comprehensive database covering 91 advanced, transition and developing economies over the period . Building on the work of Abiad and Mody (2005) , the database presents an index of financial liberalisation built around seven aspects of financial policy: credit controls and reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership of the banking sector, financial account restrictions, prudential regulations and supervision and securities market policies. The overall index is increasing in the degree of liberalisation i.e., the larger the value, the greater the degree of liberalisation.
While the database provides a very valuable resource for researchers, from a development perspective, it does not contain information for many developing economies. This is especially the case for African countries, many of whom have undertaken considerable measures towards liberalising capital markets but continue to under-perform in growth terms. The database covers 14 countries in SSA but matching these estimates to firm-level micro data provides further challenges. Only 36 countries remain, nine of whom are from SSA, if WBES firm data is merged to country estimates of financial reform from Abiad et al. (2010) . This is a limitation as using data on only nine countries in SSA masks considerable cross-country variation in the region and potentially raises issues of sample selection.
To increase the coverage of estimates of financial reform for developing economies as well as attempting to maximise the number of countries for which matched reform and firm level data are available, this paper develops an additional crosscountry measure of financial liberalisation. It is complementary to that of Abiad et al. (2010) and uses data from the World Bank financial regulation and supervision data compiled by Barth et al. (2008) . The data are available from three rounds of the survey in 2001, 2003 and 2007 and cover various aspects of financial sector policy such as banking sector entry requirements, bank activities, supervision and regulatory issues as well as bank ownership, capital and liquidity data. The building blocks for the index presented in this paper are the seven financial reform dimensions used by Abiad et al. (2010) , however, data are not available for all. The index covers the following issues: credit controls, directed lending and excessive reserve requirements, barriers to entry, restrictions on international financial flows, state control of financial institutions, prudential regulatory and supervisory policy and securities market policies. It ranges from 0 in a completely repressed system to 11 in a fully liberalised financial market. The Barth et al. (2008) database does not contain data on interest rate controls so this dimension is not covered. While the index is not as rich in coverage of the policy dimensions of financial reform as Abiad et al. (2010) , the goal is to extend the number of developing countries included. Full details of the specific variables included in the index are presented in Appendix 5. The lack of data on interest rate controls is a disadvantage of our measure as this is one of the issues that has been highlighted from early on in the financial reform literature (McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973) . However, given the wide range of policy issues across the other dimensions as well as the improved country coverage, the construction and use of this index provides an important tool for answering the research question under consideration.
Sample and Summary Statistics
Combining the WBES firm-level data and the index of financial liberalisation leaves a cross-sectional dataset of over 26,440 firms across 48 countries. We include data from the 2005 to 2009 years of the survey and map these to the 2007 database on financial regulation and supervision. We exclude 2010 data due to the potential changes in financial reform that were undertaken following the international financial crisis and the changes to regulatory standards following the BASEL III accord. The coverage across countries is presented in table 10 in Appendix 5. There are 22 countries from SSA. This is substantially more than the nine countries from SSA if the Abiad et al. (2010) financial reform index is used and merged with the WBES firm data. Table 2 presents summary statistics for the credit constraint measures, financial liberalisation index (FL Index) and other firm-and country-level characteristics. Only private domestic and foreign firms are included in the sample with state firms removed. Given implicit or explicit state guarantees, these firms face soft budget constraints and are not the focus of our research interest. The majority of the firms in the sample are privately-owned domestic companies (91%) with the remaining 9% foreign owned. On the distribution of firm size, 93% are small and medium sized ( < 250 employees). In total, 25% of firms are engaged in direct trade (either importing or exporting). In terms of a sectoral breakdown, 34% are active in the services sector with the remaining 66% engaged in manufacturing or industrial activity. Publicly-listed firms make up 4% of the sample. Source: Author's calculations using WBES data.
Total observations N = 26,440.
Financial Liberalisation and Access to Finance 51 C1-C4 are the categories of credit constrained firms outlined in Section 2.1. There is a large variance between the groups. Across the sample, 25% of firms are defined as constrained by C1 "General Constrained." C2 "New Entrants" classifies 7% of firms as constrained. This suggests that the majority of firms who are constrained using our general measure, C1, also do not have formal financial services. These firms should be some of the biggest beneficiaries if financial reform leads to a widening of the financial sector.
For C3 "Active Investors," the data show that 22% of constrained firms did undertake some investment and they financed this using either internal funds or informal sources of finance such as money lenders, friends or relatives. It is expected that this group may react less to financial liberalisation as at least some of their investment demand has been satiated. Firms categorised as C4 "Deterred Investors" are an interesting and important group. These are the firms for which capital market imperfections have led to a foregoing of profitable investment opportunities and could potentially undertake investment following successful financial reform. In total, nearly 15% of firms are classified as constrained using this measure.
The summary statistics for the FL Index are also presented in Table 2 and is compared to the IMF index in Figure 1 . As the index hypothetically runs from 0 in a completely repressive financial system to 11 in a fully open system, it can be seen that the sample average is just below the mid-point. There is a large variance with least financially liberalised countries (Niger, Togo and Burkina Faso) having a value of 1.5 while the most open score 7.5-8 (Hungary, Lithuania, Nicaragua). 
Empirical Model and Econometric Methodology
To estimate the effect of financial liberalisation on our binary indicators of credit constraints, a standard probit model is employed on the cross-sectional data. The probability of being credit constrained is modelled as:
,
where n = 1,...,4 represent the credit constraint categories. FL is the financial liberalisation index as defined above. The coefficient β FL provides the test of the main hypothesis of this paper. If β FL < 0 then credit constraints are reduced by financial liberalisation, if β FL = 0 there is no impact of financial liberalisation on access to finance. If financial liberalisation actually increases credit constraints, which may occur in situations as outlined by Emran and Stiglitz (2009) , this would be represented by β FL > 0.
To capture other aspects of the operating environment that influence the level of credit constraints, firm-level control variables are included in the vector X ij . These include firm size, firm age and binary indicators for foreign ownership and whether or not the firm is publicly listed. Firm size is modelled as a polynomial with the log of the number of employees and its square included in the analysis. An indicator is also included for whether the firm is a direct exporter or importer. The data used is cross sectional which prevents the use of a technique to explicitly remove firm-level heterogeneity, such as random or fixed effects. Including these firm-level controls should capture a considerable portion of the firm-specific effect. Sector dummies are also included.
As our data contains both within-country and cross-country variation, we also include a number of country controls in the vector Z j . The general concern with linking financial liberalisation to firm level credit constraints in a crosscountry firm level dataset is ensuring that the identification is correct. While the level of financial liberalisation is assumed to be a driver of credit availability at the country level, there is an argument that both financial liberalisation and the overall level of credit availability are jointly determined. If this is the case, it is difficult to ensure that financial liberalisation is correctly distinguished from other factors that impact the level of constraints at a country level.
Two such important factors are the general structure of the financial sector, and the overall quality of institutions in the country. The structure of the financial sector in this context refers to the degree of market power in the banking sector, the ability of banks to mobilize domestic savings, the volume of domestic financial credit and the degree of risk in the financial sector. Each of these factors in turn can impact the degree to which domestic enterprises are credit constrained over and above the effect of changes to capital controls and the degree of financial liberalisation.
Additionally, the functionality of domestic institutions can impact the general ability of firms to interact with government and their demand for finance through their faith in the stability of the institutional context and investment climate. Therefore, credit constraints may vary across countries following differences in institutions as opposed to just changes in the degree of financial liberalisation. It is therefore imperative that the general institutional quality is controlled for when assessing the effect of financial liberalisation on access to finance.
Both of these effects, the degree of institutional quality and the structure of the financial sector, can therefore impact financing constraints over and above financial liberalisation. As improvements to institutional quality and a more supportive financial structure should have a negative effect on access to credit, we would expect that, if these factors are not controlled for, then the estimated coefficient on financial liberalisation should in fact be more strongly negative.
Include controls for these factors should ensure any omitted variable bias is reduced.
While it is important to control for both financial structure factors and institutional quality variables, a clear distinction must be made between these groups of variables. Financial structure variables are in essence affected by, and codetermined with, financial liberalisation. For example changes to market power and the returns of financial institutions may occur due to entry conditions, access to international capital, or competition between bank and non-bank financing if securities markets develop. In fact the changes in many of these variables are in fact the sought after outcome of policy changes to capital controls. However, due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, there is no way to capture the initial differences in financial structures across countries without the inclusion of such variables. Therefore a set of estimates with such variables are required to ensure the financial liberalisation index is not picking up this variation.
3 Such estimates, however, are potentially biased downwards and should provide a lower bound on the effects of liberalisation.
The controls for institutional quality are less likely to be as closely codetermined with financial liberalisation. While co-determining influences may exist these are less likely to influence as strong a downward bias on the estimates. However, governance, institutional quality and the geopolitical and macroeconomic uncertainty impacts of cross-country differences in these variables may impact credit demand and thus the share of firms that are constrained in different countries. These controls are therefore essential to include in this analysis.
To control for financial factors, we use data from the World Bank financial structure database (Cihak et al. 2013 ) and include the following variables: the z-score of the banking sector to capture systemic risks that may impede credit transmission, the net interest margin and return on assets of the main banks to capture the degree of profitability of the banking sector and to capture market power concerns, 4 the total value of remittances as a percentage of GDP to indicate a reliance on external, non-official capital as a source of domestic financing and size of the domestic financial sector measured as broadmoney as a percent of GDP.
5
To control for the effect of institutional quality, we include a number of variables from the Kaufmann et al. (2010) World Governance Indicators database. We include a number of important variables including voice and accountability, the rule of law, the effectiveness of government and the overall quality of regulation.
In addition to the large range of variables across financial structure and institutional quality, we also include a number of additional country factors. We include GDP per capita, GDP growth, the log of population to capture country size and the degree of urbanisation measured as the percentage of the population living in an urban environment. We also include the transparency international corruption perception index. These variables capture additional heterogeneity in the level of credit constraints that is common across firms within a specific country and also captures cross-country differences in economic structures, economic activity, investment opportunities, and market size considerations.
A heteroscedasticity robust estimator is employed and the errors are clustered at the country level. This allows correlation across the error terms of firms within a specific country. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation.
4 Most studies include concentration ratios to capture such factors. If we did so in our benchmark model, the number of countries falls dramatically. While the main findings do not change if we include market concentration in banking, have decided to omit this variable from the main analysis. 5 An alternative to broadmoney is the credit to GDP ratio. However the correlation coefficient on these two variables in 0.76 in our data so they cannot be included simultaneously. Alternating between these variables does not change the main results.
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Results
Overall Effect
This section presents the main results of our empirical analysis. To test the effects of financial liberalisation on access to finance, controlling for both firm-level and country level factors, we present three tables. Firstly in Table 3 , we include firm controls and the variables capturing the structure of the financial market. As noted these are: banking sector z-score, banking sector net interest margin and return on assets, the total value of remittances as a percentage of GDP, and broadmoney as a percent of GDP. Secondly in Table 4 , results containing controls for institutional quality are presented with the following variables included: voice and accountability, the rule of law, the effectiveness of government and the overall quality of regulation. Thirdly in Table 5 the results including both the aforementioned groups of controls and GDP per capita, GDP growth, the log of population, urbanisation, and the transparency international corruption perception index.
Including each of these sets of variables sequentially provides insight into whether their omission has a large impact on the coefficient on liberalisation. It will also provide insight into the direction of any omitted variable bias that is caused by their absence.
In all models, we control for sector, firm size (measured as the log of the number of employees and its square), firm age, whether or not the firm is a direct trader, foreign ownership controls and legal status as well as year controls. The four categories of constraint measures are placed along the columns in each table. The marginal effect of the financial liberalisation is also presented.
Focusing on Table 3 , the coefficient on financial liberalisation is negative and significant across all four of the measures of credit constraints. The estimated effect is significant at the 1% level in all regressions. This indicates that firms in countries with higher levels of financial liberalisation face lower credit constraints, controlling for firm-specific factors and the structure of the financial sector in the economy. This finding is in line with the literature suggesting that credit access improves following reductions in capital controls and policy interventions to liberalise capital markets (Haramillo et al. 1996; Barajas et al. 2000; Gelos and Werner 2002; Koo and Shin 2004; Koo and Maeng 2005; Galindo et al. 2007; Abiad et al. 2008) .
In terms of the control variables, the negative effect on the own coefficient for log employment and the positive and significant square term indicate that constraints, across all four measures, increase with firm size, however, at a declining Notes: (1) *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
(2) All estimates are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the country level.
Source: Author's calculations using estimation sample.
rate. For active investors and new entrants, the results indicate that constraints fall with age. There is also some evidence that publicly listed firms face lower credit constraints. For the financial structure controls, the factors that appear as significant are remittances carrying a negative sign, and both bank return on assets and net interest margins which appear with a positive sign in some specifications. These Financial Liberalisation and Access to Finance 57 Notes: (1) *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
(3) Firm controls are included but the output is suppressed for presentational purposes.
results suggest that constraints fall with greater remittances but are higher in systems in which banking sector profitability is higher. The later effect may be capturing the negative effect of bank market power on SME credit access which has been identified in the literature (Ryan et al. 2014) . Table 4 presents the results including the controls for institutional quality, an important potential omitted variable group from our first regressions. Including Notes: (1) *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
these variables, our main findings remain: financial liberalisation has a negative and significant correlation with credit constraints across all four constraint measures. In fact, none of these additional factors are significant. However, as we have not controlled for country size and economic activity, these results must be noted with caution. Table 5 includes the final group of country controls in addition to the financial structure and institutional variables. Again, across all four constraint measures the impact of financial liberalisation is negative and statistically significant. Our finding therefore suggests that controlling for a range of economic, financial, and institutional country factors, as well as controlling for the firm borrower risk, increases in financial liberalisation are robustly negatively correlated with access to finance across developing economies.
Controlling for the other country factors, we find that constraints are falling as regulatory quality increases but are increasing in the degree of corruption. This suggests the importance of strong institutions for improving access to finance for firms in developing economies.
To establish the magnitude of the effect of financial liberalisation on financing constraints, Table 5 presents the probit marginal effects. The marginal effects capture the effect of a unit change in the regressors on the probability of being financially constrained. For firms classified as "General Constrained," a one unit increase in the index of financial liberalisation is associated with a reduction in the probability of facing a binding credit constraint by 4%. For "New Entrants," the magnitude of the effect is an 1% reduction in the probability of being constrained given a one unit increase in the index. These two categories of firms are particular sensitive to developments in financial markets, especially in the case of "New Entrants" who do not have access to formal financial services. Considering "Deterred Investors" a one unit increase in the degree of liberalisation is associated with a reduction in the probability of being constrained by 3%. These firms missed investment opportunities due to a lack of available finance and the results indicate that they are significant beneficiaries of financial reform. For "Active Investors," who despite being constrained, managed to invest using internal funds or informal sources of finance, an increase in the index is correlated with a 2.9% reduction in the probability of being constrained.
Given the nature of the financial liberalisation index, it is difficult from a policy perspective to interpret the marginal effect. As the index is a composite measure covering various dimensions of capital markets, changes across a broad spectrum of policies could initiate a one unit change to the index as captured by the marginal effect. However, the aim of this paper is not to consider the specific policy changes but to capture the overall degree of financial market openness and its effect on the credit environment. A simple stylised example can help to clarify. For firms classified as "General Constrained," the marginal effects indicate a one unit increase in the index is associated with a reduction in constraints by 4%. In this case, if a country with a low index score of 2.5 (such as Ivory Coast or Guinea Bissau) were to introduce financial reform measures (across any of the dimensions of financial policy considered) to boost the index by 5 units (to the level of Hungary or Lithuania), this would be associated with the probability of being constrained falling by nearly 20%.
In conclusion, these results suggest that financial liberalsation is robustly correlated with a reduction in the probability of being financially constrained, identifying a key channel through which finance can affect economic growth. By reducing the constraints of firms with and without formal financial services, capital market liberalisation not only leads to financial deepening but also financial widening.
Focus on Africa
One of the most interesting but challenging comparisons over the last 20 years from a development perspective is the contrasting growth performance of Africa and the rest of the developing world, most notably East Asia. The relative success of Asia and the continued underperformance of SSA is of particular concern to policy makers and of interest to academic researchers working in this area. As noted in Andersen et al. (2012) , despite their strong growth performance, Asia has undertaken less financial reforms as compared with other developing regions. In particular, compared to Asia, Africa has embraced financial reform but has not seen improvements in real economic growth or industrialisation (Reinhart and Tokatlidis 2003; Andersen et al. 2012) . The important role played by investment and industrialisation in the East Asian growth story also adds to this puzzle. If financial liberalisation eases credit constraints, why has higher and more efficient investment not occurred in Africa despite the continents' commitment to financial liberalisation?
With a view to informing these issues, the effect of financial liberalisation on access to finance is tested by interacting a dummy for SSA countries with the FL Index. The marginal effects from the probit model are presented in Table 6 . The interaction of SSA and FL Index is positive and significant in all cases except for "Active Investors." The probability of being credit constrained increases with the degree of capital market liberalisation in SSA for firms in these groups. This positive correlation is robust to the inclusion of a range of control variables.
While a deeper and more thorough analysis is surely warranted on the role of finance and the effects of financial reform in SSA, the lack of improvements of financial access despite a commitment to financial liberalisation may go some way towards explaining why growth has been stunted despite the reform agenda in capital markets. One factor which may play a considerable role in SSA is institutional quality. Beck et al. (2011) note the difficulties in contract enforcement and legal certainties have delayed the development of capital markets in Africa and with this the ability of financial reforms to pass through to end borrowers. This may especially be the case if the borrowers are domestic, SMEs without established links to financial institutions Additionally, Beck et al. (2011) note that a lack of understanding of the real local constraints in Africa may have hindered the ability of reform measures to pass through to domestic agents. A better understanding of the country specific contexts and political environments surrounding reform is required. Poor domestic macroeconomic management, as noted by Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2003) , may also hinder the ability of reforms to facilitate intermediation.
Another potential explanation that has been suggested for the inability of financial market reform to facilitate better growth outcomes in Africa is the issue of a lack of service density geographically (Allen et al. 2013) . If borrowers are located in remote village or country areas, while financial institutions are mainly in capital cities, then reforming capital markets will not impact borrowers on the ground. This may contribute to our findings. Again the size and income of SSA Notes: (1) *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
(3) Country controls: As per main model.
(4) Firm controls include firm age, size, ownership, publicly listed and direct trade.
(5) ME for interaction estimated using Ai and Norton (2003) .
countries may impact the development of nascent financial institutions which can also reduce the scope through which extra capital from financial liberalisation benefits borrowers. Indeed poor market outlooks or uncertainty can reduce the potential profitability of the market to foreign entrants.
To test how these effects compare to other regions, Table 11 presented in Annex 2 uses Europe and Central Asia as a base category and includes interactions for the other regional groups in our data: Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and a combined group of South Asia and East Asia and the Pacific (Asia broad). Overall the findings indicate that SSA is the only region in which there is a systematic difference in the relationship between constraints and liberalisation. All three other regions share the characteristic that constraints are negative and significantly affected by capital market liberalisation.
These estimates facilitate answering another important question: are credit constraints higher in SSA? To answer this, the effect of the regional dummy on the probability of being constrained is calculated. As the dummy is interacted with financial liberalisation, its effect must be evaluated with recourse to interaction as well as the own effect in a non-linear framework. 6 The effects are calculated using the sample mean of financial liberalisation and are presented in Table 7 . The results indicate that credit constraints are higher in SSA relative to the overall sample. The magnitude differs across the constraint categories. In categories "General Constraint" or "New Entrants," firms in SSA are 38% and 12% more likely to face financing constraints relative to the sample average. "Active investors" are 35% more likely to be constrained in SSA while "Deterred Investors" are nearly 24% more likely to face a binding financing constraint in SSA. Firms in Africa face greater financing constraints than those in other regions.
This section has potentially identified one of the explanatory factors to reconcile how, despite committing to financial reform, SSA has not achieved the Table 7 Focus on SSA -are Constraints Higher?
C(n) General constraint New entrants Active investors Deterred investors
Are credit constraints higher in SSA? ME 0.378*** 0.123*** 0.346*** 0.247*** (0.101) (0.028) (0.082) (0.068) Notes: (1) *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
6 The marginal effect for SSA is calculated as δ φ β β δ
A A FL P C n FinLib SSA X Financial Liberalisation and Access to Finance 63 supposed benefits of capital market liberalisation. The findings indicate that financial liberalisation in Africa has not led to a reduction in financing constraints faced by firms. While there are many other reasons why growth in Africa may have been stunted 7 , poor access to investment finance for domestic firms is one potential explanation for the lack of progress on industrialisation. Improving credit transmission mechanisms to domestic firms in Africa, on this evidence, can be growth positive.
However, while the findings for SSA pose interesting questions about the benefits and structure of financial liberalisation in the region, it must be noted that the index presented does not capture data on interest rate restrictions which are an important component in the policymakers toolkit for managing financial markets. In this context, our result may reflect the omission of this important element from our index. If data can be collated for the SSA including information on interest rate controls then further research should certainly focus to explore this issue in more detail. However, our research still suggests that across a range of non-interest controls, the benefits of financial liberalisation do not materialise in SSA relative to other regions
Decomposing Liberalisation: What Factors Matter?
As noted in Section 2.2, our index builds on the work of Abiad and Mody (2005) , and covers the following issues: credit controls, directed lending and excessive reserve requirements, barriers to entry, restrictions on international financial flows, state control of financial institutions, prudential regulatory and supervisory policy and securities market policies. It ranges from 0 in a completely repressed system to 11 in a fully liberalised financial market.
While to this point we have established evidence that indicates a negative relationship between financial liberalisation and credit access, it is interesting from a policy perspective to explore which of the subcomponents of the index are driving these findings. Table 8 re-estimates the main benchmark model presented in Table 5 for the overall "General Constraint" but replaces the financial market liberalisation index each of its subcomponents. The results are then presented for all subcomponents simultaneously. In the regressions with the individual subcomponents, it must be noted that the other index elements are omitted variables and are potentially impacting the estimated coefficients.
The two subcomponents that appear to be highly correlated with reductions in credit constraints are the development of the securities markets and the ability of banks to engage in international financial activities. These results suggest that allowing banking sector firms to allocate funding to develop securities markets can help reduce the credit constraints that firms face. If banks learn new evaluation and monitoring activities by engaging in developing securities market financing, this may improve the ability of the financial system to target constrained borrowers and reduce information asymmetries between opaque borrowers and lenders. Additionally, allowing banks to engage in international financial activities can increase the pool of finance they have available to lend and this can be channelled back to domestic borrowers. While not significant individually, in the full specification, there is evidence that reducing state control of the banking sector is also a positive policy development in terms of reducing domestic credit constraints. We find no effect of removing credit controls and financial supervision. Entry barriers are associated with higher credit constraints, controlling for the other factors, which is an unexpected result.
While these results are informative, they must also be interpreted within the context of broader capital market policy. In many cases, countries may not make single discrete changes to financial market openness but undertake policy changes on a number of aspects simultaneously. In this regard, and the fact that this analysis is essentially cross-sectional, the overall liberalisation index is a better indicator of the countries capital openness and how this affects constraints. 
Do the Effects Differ Across Age, Size and Ownership?
While financial reform policies are introduced at the country level, their effect on firms is potentially heterogeneous depending on the characteristics of the firms, their interaction with capital markets and individual financing strategies.
To explore the differential effect of financial liberalisation on access to finance across the population of firms, we interact the liberalisation index with firm characteristics. We focus on firm age, size, ownership and whether or not the firm is publicly listed on a stock market or whether or not the firm is foreign owned. For firm age, we use categorical age indicators to test for discrete choice effects. We would expect that smaller firms and young firms to face higher constraints due to greater financial market imperfections, a lack of a track record or collateral or less well developed banking relationships. In terms of a priori expectations, it is unclear whether or not foreign firms would be the main beneficiaries of domestic financial reform. Foreign companies are, in the main, well supplied with credit from international markets and usually bring capital to invest in host economies. However, there is some evidence that foreign firms do compete for capital with domestic firms (Harrison and Mcmillan 2003) . For publicly-listed firms, as they already have access to stock market finance and the earlier results indicate they are less constrained, it is expected that they benefit less from financial liberalisation. Table 9 presents the marginal effects for the probit model for each of the groups indicated. The marginal effects for the interaction terms are estimated following the procedure outlined in Ai and Norton (2003) and the overall marginal effect is then estimated at the values of the variables of interest from a regression including the interactions.
Focusing on firm age, in line with expectations, there is a negative and significant correlation between financial liberalisation and credit constraints across all age groups, however, the association is larger for younger firms. For example, focusing on the general constraint, the marginal effect for firms age < 8 years is -0.04 whereas the marginal effect is -0.02 for firms over 20 years of age. These results indicate that as firm age increases, the reduction in constraints associated with financial liberalisation is lessened. This finding is intuitive as younger firms are usually the most constrained and, if liberalisation improves the functioning of the financial market, we would hope they are amongst the greatest recipients of additional credit. Older firms have well established relationships with financial institutions and, on this evidence, are not the main beneficiaries of financial liberalisation.
In the regressions of firm size and financial liberalisation, the comparison of the average marginal effect of liberalisation is lower for large firms than SMEs in Notes: (1) *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
(2) ME for interaction estimated using Ai and Norton (2003) .
three of the four constraint indicators. This indicates that while financial liberalisation is robustly correlated with a reduction in credit constraints for all firms, there is a further reduction for small-and medium-sized firms compared to large firms. This is a positive finding as the literature suggests SMEs face particularly difficult challenges in accessing credit. These firms in many cases do not have access to international finance and are reliant solely on domestic capital markets. Focusing on foreign versus private domestic ownership, the average effects indicate that it is only domestic firms that benefit from financial liberalisation in terms of a reduction in domestic credit access. The effects are insignificant across all four measures for foreign firms whereas the effect is negative and significant for domestic firms. This suggests that private domestic firms benefit more from domestic financial reform than foreign firms. As is noted, foreign firms are more likely to bring their own capital or source finance on international markets so developments in domestic capital markets are less likely to influence these companies.
On the effect of financial liberalisation on publicly-listed firms, we find that the average effect is insignificant for publicly listed firms but positive and significant for unlisted firms. This indicates that listed firms benefit less than non-listed firms from capital market openness and is in line with previous research into the stock market activity and firm size in developing countries (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1996) . Unlisted firms are potentially have assess to a much more limited range of financing sources and are thus more susceptible to bank financing constraints.
Concluding Remarks
This paper considers the effect of financial liberalisation on access to finance using firm-level data covering 48 developing and transition countries. An index of financial liberalisation is presented which measures the degree to which capital markets are liberalised in the following policy areas: directed lending, credit controls and reserve requirements, state control of banking, openness of international financial flows, banking market entry, prudential regulation and supervision and securities market development. It covers a larger number of developing countries, including 22 SSA countries. The measurement of access to finance follows Byiers et al. (2010) and presents four variant indicators of whether firms face difficulties in accessing financial markets. The measures are built around survey questions covering loan applications denied, the use of internal or informal resources for investment, the reasons for not making loan applications and whether the firm has formal finance facilities.
A number of conclusions emerge. First, financial liberalisation is associated with a reduction in the probability of being credit constrained by approximately 3-4% depending on the firms initial position. Our results indicate that this association holds for both firms with no formal finance as well as currently banked firms. This suggests both a deepening and widening of the financial sector occurs with increased liberalisation. The effect of financial reform on access to finance is strongest for young firms and domestic private small-and medium-sized enterprises. The effect is not as strong for older, foreign and publicly-listed firms.
While for the whole sample, the results point to a positive benefit of financial liberalisation in reducing financing constraints, the findings for SSA provide mixed evidence regarding the effect of financial reform on firms facing financing constraints. In SSA, increased financial liberalisation is actually associated with an increase in credit constraints in the categories examined. Research by Andersen et al. (2012) highlights the fact that Africa has been particularly reformist in capital markets, but yet growth continues to be stunted. While our research does not provide direct evidence on the formal role of finance in unlocking economic growth, the result that financial liberalisation is not associated with a reduction in financing constraints in SSA may be one of the explanations for why, despite extensive reforms, SSA has not seen the benefits of financial liberalisation. Given many of the SSA countries are at a much lower level of development with weaker governance and institutions, capital market liberalisation for countries in such a position should be managed carefully, if not avoided, without adequate safeguards.
Focusing on the subcomponents of the FL index, the variables with the strongest negative association with credit constraints are the development of the securities markets and the ability of banks to engage in international financial activities. This may be due to learning by banks in credit allocation and a reduced reliance on limited domestic savings respectively. While not significant individually, in the full specification, there is evidence that reducing state control of the banking sector is also a positive policy development as it is associated with reduced domestic credit constraints. We find no effect of removing credit controls and financial supervision.
Finally we find entry barriers are associated with higher credit constraints. This result is counter to conventional models but is in line in Emran and Stiglitz (2009) who note that liberalisation can reduce the incentives financial institutions have to provide experimental capital to entrepreneurs through poaching externalities in competitive systems or the reduction in the comfort and absorptive capacity that lower competition rents provide for risk-finance provision.
From a policy perspective, understanding the magnitude of the changes to our overall effect is difficult due to the nature of the index.
8 A stylised example may provide some clarification. If we consider firms classified as "General Constrained," a one unit increase in the index reduces constraints by 4%. If a country with a low index score of 2.5 (such as Ivory Coast or Guinea Bissau) were to introduce financial reform measures to boost the index by 5 units (to the level of Hungary or Lithuania), this would reduce the probability of being constrained by 20%. However, that we find the effects are adverse for SSA, if such changes are not implemented concurrently with improvements in governance and institutions, then these benefits may not materialise.
Overall, the results in this paper suggest that while financial liberalisation is associated with a reduction in the degree of credit constraints, this is not the case for countries in SSA. These findings suggest that capital reform policy should be tailored to the country-specific conditions and be mindful of overall levels of governance and the quality of domestic institutions.
-2 if financial institutions are unrestricted in their engagement in securities market activities.
The overall index is the sum of the above categories.
Annex 2: Data and Results
Table 10 presents a detailed outline of the number of observations per country as well as the country values of the financial liberalisation index and "General Constrained" measure. The results in the table below present a full evaluation of the effects by region. Notes: (1) *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
